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JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 





(2) Without limiting the scope of Subsection 
(1) , a supplier commits a deceptive act or 
practice if the supplier, with intent to 
deceive: 
(c) indicates that the subject of a 
consumer transaction is new, or unused, if 
it is not, or has been used to an extent 
that is materially different from the 
fact; 6 
(2) Without limiting the scope of Subsection 
(1) , a supplier commits a deceptive act or 
practice if the supplier, with intent to 
deceive: 
(d) indicates that the subject of a 
consumer transaction is available to the 




(2) A consumer who suffers loss as a result 
of a violation of this chapter may recover, 
but not in a class action, actual damages or 
$2,000, whichever is greater, plus court 
costs 9, 12 
41-6-158(4) (2) 
(1) At least once each year the department 
shall require that every motor vehicle 
registered in this state or bearing temporary 
permits or Utah plates, except off-highway 
vehicles, be inspected and that an official 
certificate of inspection and approval be 
obtained for each vehicle. 
(2) The inspection shall be made and 
certificate obtained with respect to the 
mechanism, brakes, and equipment of every 
vehicle designated by the department under 
this section 3 
15 USC 1989 (1) and (2) 
(a) Any person who, with intent to defraud, 
violates any requirement imposed under this 
subchapter shall be liable in an amount equal 
to the sum of 
(1) three times the amount of actual damages 
sustained or $1,500, whichever is the greater; 
and 
(2) in the case of any successful action 
to enforce the foregoing liability, the 
costs of the action, together with 
reasonable attorney fees as determined by 
the court. 
iii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendants-appellants (hereinafter defendant) acquired a 
Nissan automobile as a salvage vehicle. Repair and sale of salvage 
vehicles is common in the used car business and such vehicles can 
be repaired to be perfectly safe. 
Defendant had the vehicle repaired and sold it to plaintiff-
appellee (hereinafter plaintiff). It had passed a Utah Safety 
Inspection. A year later, plaintiff again had the vehicle inspected 
and again it passed the safety inspection. Plaintiff had driven it 
some 14,000 miles. 
Subsequently, plaintiff had problems with the steering of 
the vehicle. At that time, it was found to be unsafe to drive. 
It is impossible to determine when the damage making the 
vehicle unsafe to drive occurred, but it was after being driven by 
plaintiff for over a year, over 14,000 miles, and after the second 
safety inspection. 
Plaintiff claims—inter alia—that defendant misrepresented 
the condition of the vehicle at the time of sale and the reasons 
for selling the same, and this was done with intent to deceive. 
The Honorable Scott Daniels, Judge of the Third District 
Court, entered an amended judgment in favor of plaintiff on January 
23, 1992, ordering a rescission of the sales contract. None of the 
parties had requested a rescission. In ordering a rescission, the 
court did not give defendant any credit or consideration for the 
benefit plaintiff received by driving the vehicle over 14,000 miles 
and using it for over a year. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendants and appellants Kim Edward Conover and Karen Jane 
Conover (husband and wife) are a partnership operating a used car 
dealership under the name of K & K Sales. Karen Jane Conover takes 
no part in the management of the business. (TR. 58) 
Defendant and appellant Western Surety Company is a 
corporation authorized to do business in the State of Utah as a 
bonding company and furnished a bond in the amount of $20,000 for 
K & K Sales, as required by the Motor Vehicle Act. (TR. 58, 59) 
On October 12, 1987, K & K Sales, acting by Kim Edward 
Conover, purchased a 1986 Nissan Sentra four wheel drive automobile 
(the subject vehicle) from Western Affiliated Auction. It had been 
damaged on the right side and classified as totaled by the 
insurance company. (TR 46, 47) 
Automobiles that have sustained the type of damage incurred 
by the subject vehicle can be repaired by straightening and 
squaring so that they are safe. This is done all the time. (TR. 
163, 168, 169) 
Kim Edward Conover drove the subject vehicle to the shop of 
defendant David Gray, where it was repaired by an employee of David 
Gray. Kim Edward Conover furnished needed parts and told David Gray 
how he wanted it repaired. (TR. 71, 125, 131) 
After the subject vehicle was repaired, Karen Jane Conover 
used it for errands around town. In March or April of 1989, the 
Conovers determined they needed a different car because Karen Jane 
Conover was expecting. They then put the subject vehicle up for 
sale. (TR. 13, 48) 
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On April 19, 1988, plaintiff purchased the subject vehicle 
for $6,800 plus sales tax of $375. Plaintiff was allowed $800 
toward the* sales price for a trade-in of an Escort automobile. Kim 
Edward Conover paid for the registration. 
The NADA (formerly "Blue Book") as of the date of 
plaintiff's purchase, listed the "high" value of the subject 
vehicle at $8,700, and the "low" value at $7,550. Thus, the 
purchase price paid by plaintiff was $750 less than the "low book 
value." (TR. 14, 147) 
Plaintiff testified she was not aware that Kim Edward 
Conover was a used car dealer until just before she purchased the 
subject vehicle. (TR. 14, 18, 20) 
Defendant testified he told plaintiff he was a used car 
dealer. He registered the subject vehicle and furnished her with a 
temporary sticker which permitted her to drive it until he obtained 
the registration and license plates for her. (TR. 18, 50, 56) 
Plaintiff testified that defendant told her the subject 
vehicle had "the right front fender bent and he had replaced that 
and the right front headlight." (TR. 16, 17) 
Defendant testified that he told plaintiff "all about" the 
subject vehicle. (TR. 56) 
Plaintiff did not ask for a guarantee on the vehicle. (TR. 
191) 
Pursuant to Section 41-6-158, UCA 1953, as amended, all 
automobiles registered in Utah are required to have a recent Utah 
Safety Inspection when ownership is changed, and yearly when the 
registration is renewed. Persons performing the inspections are 
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required to be licensed. A manual is provided by the State which 
governs what is to be inspected and how the inspection is to be 
performed. This manual sets forth, in detail, the standards 
vehicles need to meet to pass the safety inspection. These include 
the movement of wheels and steering, any vertical looseness, 
looseness in the rods, steeraging linkage play, wheel bearings, 
ball joints, torsion bar control arms, etc. (Exh. D-3 3) 
A State of Utah Safety Inspection Certificate for the 
subject vehicle was furnished to plaintiff when it was registered 
in her name in April of 198b. (TR. 36) 
After the purchase, plaintiff drove the subject vehicle for 
some 14,789 miles over a period of more than a year. This included 
a trip to Flagstaff, Arizona, and back. (TR. 21, 41, Exhs. P-2, P-
6, P-17) 
Plaintiff did not experience any problem with the subject 
vehicle until the end of October or beginning of November, 1988, 
some six months after the purchase and after having driven it to 
Flagstaff. At that time, it began to pull to the right. (TR. 21) 
Plaintiff had the subject vehicle aligned on more than one 
occasion, purchased a total of six tires for it, and had the ball 
joints replaced. (TR. 21, 22, 23) 
In April of 1989 (a year after the purchase) plaintiff was 
required to renew the registration on the subject vehicle. As 
stated, renewal of the registration required a recent Utah Safety 
Inspection Certificate. Plaintiff had the subject vehicle inspected 
on April 21, 1989. On its face the Safety Certificate shows: 
"Wheels Pulled: RF RR." The vehicle passed inspection. (Exh. D-13) 
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After experiencing some problems, approximately three weeks 
after obtaining the second Utah Safety Inspection Certificate, 
plaintiff took the subject vehicle to Less Jenson's Collision 
Repair. It was determined that it had been damaged on the right 
side and required extensive repairs. Plaintiff was given an 
estimate of the cost of repairing the subject vehicle which was 
dated May 15, 1989. (TR. 120, Exh. P-6) 
When the subject vehicle was examined at Less Jenson's 
Collision Repair, it was found unsafe to drive and would not have 
passed a Utah Safety Inspection. It was not possible to ascertain 
when the damage was done. But if it passed a safety inspection in 
April of 1989, following the guidelines and rules set out in 
Exhibit D-13 (which it did) , "it would be safe to assume the damage 
occurred after that date." (TR. 122, 123, 166, 182, 183) 
The damage could have been caused by a "curb, gutter, 
chuckhole, any number of things, hitting a chuckhole in a hard turn 
could damage — put swage — put a bind on the lower control arm." 
(TR. 174) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The evidence and exhibits presented to the court do not 
show that defendant made any misrepresentations to plaintiff. She 
knew the car was used and had been repaired. She knew its mileage, 
and she knew defendant was a dealer whose wife had been using the 
car for errands. 
2. Plaintiff did not suffer any loss because of any act 
or failure to act of defendant. She drove the vehicle over a year, 
for over 14,000 miles and had it then inspected for safety in order 
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to obtain a new registration. It passed this inspection which it 
could not have done if it had been damaged as claimed at the time 
it was sold. It is impossible to ascertain when the damage 
occurred, but it occurred after the last safety inspection. 
3. In ordering a rescission the court did not take into 
account the benefit received by plaintiff by using the vehicle for 
over a year and driving it more than 14,000 miles. Thus, she was 
unjustly enriched. 
4. Plaintiff was allowed attorney's fees for legal work 
performed on causes of action on which she did not prevail. She 
should only be entitled to work done on causes of action on which 
she was successful. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT'S FINDINGS THAT DEFENDANT KIM EDWARD 
CONOVER MADE FALSE STATEMENTS TO PLAINTIFF WITH 
INTENT TO DECEIVE IN VIOLATION OF SECTIONS (A) 
13-11-4 (C) AND (B) 13-11-4(0), UCA 1953, AS 
AMENDED, ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
(A) Section 13-11-4(0), UCA 1953, as amended provides: 
(2) Without limiting the Scope of Subsection (1), 
a supplier commits a deceptive act or practice if 
the supplier, with intent to deceive: 
(c) indicates that the subject of a consumer 
transaction is new, or unused, if it is not, 
or has been used to an extent that is 
materially different from the fact; 
The evidence given by plaintiff concerning the 
representations made by defendant to her with respect to the 
subject vehicle are as follows: 
Q (By Mr. Martineau) Okay, was there any discussions at 
that time about the condition of the car? 
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A Not at that point; however, when we were getting ready to 
leave, we went out into the yard and he told me that the car had, 
at one point, the right front fender bent and he had replaced the 
right front headlight. 
Q Was anything said about the condition of the vehicle? 
A No. 
Q Did he tell you it had been wrecked? 
A No. Not beyond the fender bender. 
Q Did he tell you that it had been totaled? 
A No. 
Q Did he tell you from whom he had obtained the vehicle? 
A No. (TR. 16-17) 
Q (By Mr. Barker) I hand you Exhibit P-2 and ask you if 
this signature appearing on the upper right-hand is your signature? 
A It is. 
Q I will ask you if the odometer statement reading is not 
also set forth in that? 
A It is. 
Q What is that odometer statement; read it for me, will 
you? 
A Yes. It says 21,005 miles. (TR 41, Exh. P-2) 
Q (By Mr. Barker) Mrs. Bloomer, you didn't ask Mr. Conover 
to give you a guarantee on this automobile, did you? 
A No, I did not. (TR. 191) 
In the foregoing statements given by plaintiff there is no 
evidence that defendant indicated the subject vehicle was "new, or 
unused, if it is not, or has been used to an extent that is 
materially different from the fact." On the contrary, her evidence 
discloses that she knew the vehicle had been in an accident, that 
the right front fender and right headlight had been replaced, and 
that the odometer reading was 21,005 miles. 
Furthermore, there is no evidence that defendant made any 
statement with "intent to deceive." Rather, the evidence was that 
he had every right to believe the subject vehicle was in safe 
condition. 
The following evidence was given by plaintiff: 
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Q And now, when you registered it [the subject vehicle] in 
your name, you had to have a State of Utah Safety Inspection 
Certificate, did you not? 
A In the beginning, I did not; he got it. 
Q But there was one and it was furnished when you 
registered the car in your name? 
A Right. (TR. 36) 
Moreover, a year and some 14,000 miles later, the subject 
vehicle was again determined to be safe to drive when plaintiff had 
it inspected. (Exh. D-13) 
(B) Section 13-ll-4(d), UCA 1953, as amended provides: 
(2) Without limiting the Scope of Subsection (1) , 
a supplier commits a deceptive act or practice if 
the supplier, with intent to deceive: 
(d) indicates that the subject of a consumer 
transaction is available to the consumer for 
a reason that does not exist; 
The court (page 4 of the Court7s ruling) stated: 
Also Section D, making it unlawful for 
the supplier to indicate that the subject of 
the consumer transaction is available to the 
consumer for a reason that does not exist, 
I believe the evidence in this case as I 
weighted it, would indicate that Mr. Conover 
indicated the reason that he wanted to sell 
it was because it was a family car. His wife 
was pregnant. He needed to get rid of it for 
that reason. 
All those things were technically true. 
The fact he is a dealer in automobiles was 
in the business of repairing and selling was 
not disclosed to the plaintiff. I think that 
is a violation of Section D. (Emphasis 
added.) 
The following testimony was given by plaintiff: 
Q (By Mr. Martineau) Up to this time, were you aware that 
he was a licensed motor vehicle dealer? 
A No. 
Q And were you provided with any papers other than this 
calculator type? 
A No. Only that and the window sticker. And at that point 
I went to give him the check for 6,375 he had let me know that he 
was an RV dealer, never did mention that he was a dealer, as such. 
(TR. 18) (Emphasis added.) 
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Q (By Mr. Martineau) I'll hand you what's been marked for 
identification as plaintiff's Exhibit 1 and ask you if you can 
identify that document. 
A Yes. That's a copy of the odometer statement. 
Q Does that bear your signature? 
A Yes, it does. 
Q Did Mr. Conover explain what this document was? 
A I think he just said that he had—because he was a 
dealer, held to fill out an odometer statement. (TR. 18) (Emphasis 
added.) 
There is absolutely no evidence that defendant indicated 
that the subject vehicle was "available" to plaintiff-appellee "for 
a reason that does not exist." The evidence clearly discloses that 
he informed plaintiff he was a dealer. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFF IS PRECLUDED FROM RECOVERING UNDER THE 
UTAH CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES ACT BECAUSE SHE DID 
NOT SUFFER A LOSS. 
(A) Section 13-11-9(2), UCA 1953, as amended provides: 
(2) A consumer who suffers loss as a result of a 
violation of this chapter may recover, but not in 
a class action, actual damages or $2,000, 
whichever is greater, plus court costs. (Emphasis 
added.) 
There is no evidence in the record that plaintiff suffered 
any loss by reason of any act or failure to act of defendant. As 
previously indicated, the subject vehicle passed a Utah Safety 
Inspection at the time it was purchased by plaintiff. (TR. 3 6) 
After plaintiff had driven it for a year and some 14,000 miles she 
again had a safety inspection and again it was declared safe. (Exh. 
D-13) 
After the subject vehicle had passed the second Utah Safety 
Inspection, it was taken to Less Jenson's Collision Repair. It was 
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examined by Ed Jenson, a witness for plaintiff. He testified as 
follows: 
Q (By Mr. Barker) And you said that in your opinion, the 
car was unsafe to drive? 
A Yes. 
Q Then I take it that if you had been inspecting that car 
for safety to issue a safety certificate, you wouldn't have issued 
a safety certificate? 
A Definitely not. (TR. 122, 123) 
Burt DeBock was called as a witness by defendant. He is 
employed in the Auto Repair Section of Hinckley's Dodge 
Incorporated. He testified as follows: 
Q (By Mr. Barker) All right. Do you know — and this is a 
repetition of my first question, but I repeat the question — you 
heard the testimony of Mr. Jenson? 
A Yes. 
Q You heard him testify that a vehicle in the condition 
that he described would be dangerous to drive? 
A Yes. 
Q Based upon your own experience in the automobile repair 
business and on the rules promulgated by the Utah Motor Vehicle 
Division, would you agree with what he said? 
A Yes. 
Q When you inspected that vehicle, was there any way that 
vou could tell when it had been damaged? 
A No. (Emphasis added.) 
Q If it passed a safety inspection in April of 1989, 
following the guidelines and rules set forth in Exhibit 33(13), 
would it be safe to assume those damages occurred after that date? 
A Yes, if it was done that way. (TR. 166-167) (Emphasis 
added.) 
No witness refuted or contradicted the testimony given by 
Mr. DeBock. 
Jack Lambrose, a heavy duty frame repairman at Hinckley's 
Dodge, called as a witness by defendant-appellant, testified as 
follows: 
Q (By Mr. Barker) Is it possible to take a car that's been 
damaged, and straighten the frame or square the frame as it sits 
here and still have a safe vehicle? 
A Yes. 
Q Do vou do that all the time? 
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A I do that every day. (TR. 168, 169) (Emphasis added.) 
Q What could cause the damage that this vehicle suffered? 
A Curb, gutter, chuckhole, any number of things, hitting a 
chuckhole in a hard turn could damage — put swage — put a bind 
on the lower arm. (TR. 174) (Emphasis added.) 
Mr,. DeBock's testimony was not refuted or contradicted. 
Ed Jenson, called on redirect and recross, after having 
heard the foregoing testimony, testified as follows: 
Q (By Mr. Barker) Please answer the question. Would it have 
passed a safety inspection by a qualified inspector? 
A It would not. 
(Objection, which was over-ruled.) 
A Yes, With the rephrasing of the question, a qualified 
safety inspector — if a qualified safety inspection was done 
properly, there is no way it would pass. (Emphasis added.) 
Q To be a safety inspector in the Sate of Utah, you have to 
have a license from the state; do you not? 
A I believe that's true. 
Q You have to have certain minimum qualifications? 
A I believe that is true. (TR. 182, 183) 
In summary, plaintiff purchased the subject vehicle in April 
of 1988. She was furnished with a Utah Safety Inspection 
Certificate. She drove it for a year and some 14,000 miles, 
including a. trip to Flagstaff, Arizona. In April of 1989, she had 
a safety inspection made so she could renew the registration. It 
passed the safety inspection. It could not have passed the safety 
inspection in the condition in which it was found in May of 1989. 
The damage occurred after the April 1989 inspection. It is 
impossible to tell how the damage occurred. It could have been from 
a "curb, gutter, chuckhole, any number of things ." 
There is a complete lack of proof that plaintiff suffered 
any loss as a result of any act or failure to act of defendant. 
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POINT III 
AFTER ORDERING A RESCISSION OF THE CONTRACT OF 
SALE OF THE SUBJECT VEHICLE, THE COURT ERRED IN 
UNJUSTLY ENRICHING PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE BY 
REQUIRING DEFENDANT-APPELLANT TO REFUND THE 
ENTIRE PURCHASE PRICE WITHOUT ANY COMPENSATION 
FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLEES USE OF THE VEHICLE, OR, 
INSOFAR AS POSSIBLE, RETURNING THE PARTIES TO THE 
STATUS QUO, 
Plaintiff-Appellee's Second Amended Complaint (R-110) sets 
forth five causes of action against defendant-appellants Kim Edward 
Conover, Karen Jane Conover, and K & K Sales• In each count damages 
are requested. 
There is no request in the Second Amended Complaint for a 
rescission of the contract of sale. 
The only violations found by the court involved the Utah 
Consumer Sales Practices Act (13-11-1 et seq., UCA 1953, as 
amended.) 
The only remedy provided a consumer in that act is an action 
for damages. (13-11-9(2), Supra.) There is no provision for 
rescission. 
In its ruling the court stated: 
Now, in terms of remedy, I think this is not 
in the nature of fraud and that's an 
equitable—usually the equitable remedy in 
a fraud case is rescission, and I think 
that's the most appropriate remedy in this 
case. Therefore, I'm going to order 
rescission and award judgment to the 
plaintiff in the amount that she paid for 
the car, which is $7,175 and then she will 
be required to return the automobile 
(Ruling of the Court Pg. 4) 
When the court made the above ruling, the defendant moved 
that the court comply with the rules of equity in rescission cases, 
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grant defendants compensation for plaintiff's use of the subject 
vehicle, and, in-so-far as possible, return the parties to the 
status quo. Defendant filed an affidavit of Richard Warner stating 
the lease value for the period plaintiff used the subject vehicle, 
together with an affidavit of Kim Conover concerning the condition 
of the subject vehicle. (R. 173, 185, 193, 195) 
Defendant's motion was not granted by the court. 
As cited to the trial court (R. 174), an article in Corpus 
Juris Secundum, Volume 12A at page 724, discusses the equitable 
principles involved in a rescission. Citing numerous authorities 
(which are omitted), the article states: 
Generally, the person seeking 
cancellation or rescission will not be 
allowed to derive any unconscionable 
advantage from the cancellation, and subject 
to some limitations and exceptions, the 
general rule is that plaintiff must, as a 
condition to his obtaining relief, restore 
defendant as far as possible to the position 
which he occupied before the transaction 
which is sought to be rescinded. The basis 
for this rule is that the remedy of 
cancellation, like other forms of equitable 
relief, is subject to the MAXIM that he who 
seeks equity must do equity, and equity will 
not assist one who repudiates his contract 
but retains its benefits. 
Restoration of status quo means the 
return of, or offer to return, that which 
has been received, such as consideration, 
and all benefits and profits which plaintiff 
may have realized from the transaction. 
The rule requiring restoration is the 
same with respect to both real and personal 
estate, and applies irrespective of the 
ground on which cancellation is sought, be 
it for fraud, mistake, misrepresentation, 
duress, nonperformance, undue influence, or 
want or failure of consideration. 
13 
In a 1984 case (Horton v. Horton, 495 P.2d 102), the Utah 
Supreme Court enunciated the above cited principles of equity. At 
page 107 the court stated: 
It is not the intent of equity actions such 
as this to punish a transgressor or to 
permit any party, whether innocent or not, 
to reap a benefit from the fraudulent 
transaction that he would not have reaped if 
the transaction had not taken place. The 
purpose of an equity action is to restore 
the parties to the status quo to the extent 
possible. (See also: Green Chevrolet Co. v. 
Kemp. Sup. Ct. Arkansas, 1966, 406 S.W. 2d 
142; Heimerdinger v. Standard Motor Sales. 
Sup. Ct. Michigan, 1938, 281 N.W. 317; 
MacDavid Pontiac, Inc. v. Nix. App. Ct. 
Tex., 1984, 681 S.W. 2d 831; Bezner v. 
Continental Dry Cleaners. Inc.. Sup. Ct. 
Utah, 1976, 548 P.2d 898) 
In this case plaintiff used the subject vehicle for over a 
year and drove it over 14,000 miles. It was error for the court to 
order a rescission without awarding defendant compensation for the 
benefit plaintiff received, and attempting, insofar as possible, to 
restore the parties to the status quo. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING PLAINTIFF ATTORNEY'S 
FEES FOR WORK DONE ON FIVE CAUSES OF ACTION WHEN 
THE COURT ONLY FOUND FOR PLAINTIFF ON ONE CAUSE 
OF ACTION. 
In this matter, plaintiff filed a complaint, an amended 
complaint, and a second amended complaint. (R. 2, 74, 110) Each set 
forth different, or additional, causes of action. 
In none of the causes is an award made for attorney's fees 
if a plaintiff is not successful. This includes the Motor Vehicle 
Information and Cost Saving Act of 1972. (15 U.S.C. 1981 et seq., 
at Section 1989.) 
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In theory, if a plaintiff is allowed to recover attorney's 
fees for work on multiple causes of action in situations where he 
only prevails on one he could allege a hundred causes and claim 
horrendous fees. 
The court should have granted defendant's motion to require 
plaintiff to disclose the time spent on the successful cause and 
disallow fees for causes on which plaintiff-appellee was not 
successful. 
CONCLUSION 
This court should dismiss plaintiff's complaint for no cause 
of action and should vacate the amended judgment entered against 
defendants;. 
In the alternative (if the judgment is sustained) this court 
should remand this matter to the Third District Court with 
instructions to apply the rules of equity to the ordered 
rescission, to avoid unjustly enriching plaintiff, and, insofar as 
possible, return the parties to the status quo. 
DATES this ^ 7 day of July, 1992. 
les L. Barker, Jr. 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellants 
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